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Introduction
The effect of the crisis on migration flows has been remarkable in the EU. According to The immigration flows of the expansionary period significantly changed the composition of the Spanish population: by January 2013, foreign nationals amounted to 11.7% and Spanish citizens born abroad to more than 3.3% (see Table 1 ). The foreign population in Spain is mostly from other EU countries, Latin America and North Africa.
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The effects of the Great Recession on the Spanish labour market have also been remarkable. Since 2008 Q1 employment has fallen by almost 18.5%. The average unemployment rate peaked at 26.9% at the beginning of 2013, but unemployment is much higher among the young (over 55%) and the immigrant population (almost 40%). The increase in the unemployment rate has been quite general, affecting all regions and population groups, even those with high educational levels and skills (see Chart 1).
Compared to the national population, the foreign population is younger, with a higher share of male workers (see Table 2 ). Educational levels of foreign nationals largely depend on their country of origin, with the current mix of nationalities yielding an average educational level among immigrants below that of Spanish nationals.
Accordingly, given the high share of recent immigrants and the high unemployment rates for all population groups, it seems likely that Spain is in transition from massive immigration to vast emigration, although the heterogeneity difference in migration costs would definitely affect the composition of migration outflows. In any event, this seems to provide a suitable context to test some of the existing theories about migration, both in respect of return migration and the importance of pull factors on emigration by nationals, which at least in the To address these questions this paper builds on the description of migration inflows and outflows in Spain during the Great Recession. We use our findings to draw some conjectures on Spain's "emigration potential" and its consequences in the near future. The paper continues as follows. First, we describe the data sources used to measure migration inflows and outflows. Next, we briefly revisit the history of international migration in Spain since the mid-1900s, to place our analysis of the current situation in a broader historical context. We then focus on the migration inflows and outflows of foreign nationals, and on the outflows of Spaniards born in Spain, to estimate their responses to economic conditions, considering also their socio-demographic composition. We conclude with some comments on the implications of these migration flows for future potential growth.
Data
Data on gross migration flows in Spain are quite limited, both in terms of volume and time span.
Until recently, data on migration outflows were obtained exclusively from records of passengers leaving the country by sea or air and from information on official bilateral programmes of organised migration to Europe. This is why most of the studies on Spanish emigration had to rely on destination country information. report that they return to their birth country (see Table 3 ).
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To analyse the educational composition of inflows, we rely on Labour Force Survey data, which provide information on foreign/Spanish nationals who resided abroad one year ago. To obtain a proxy for exits, we use information, from the same source on household members who are temporarily working abroad. In principle one might expect that, at least for Spanish nationals, when a household decides to emigrate, the head of the household moves first, followed by the other household members. In both cases, the information will be used only to characterise flows in terms of educational attainments of migrants.
Data on the population of foreign nationals in the origin country is obtained from the Since 1950, net migration outflows can be clearly split into three different periods.
Early emigration . Early in this period the main destination was South America, which attracted some 50 thousand migrants per year, followed in the 1960s by Europe (mostly France, Germany and Switzerland), with average annual flows of around 170 thousand migrants (see Table 4 ). In the 1960s some 80% of total emigrants went to Europe, reaching a peak of 7 per thousand of the total population mid-decade. Emigration to Europe was mostly driven by the shortage of unskilled workers to fill jobs in agriculture or manufacturing in the destination countries. From the mid-1960s these emigration flows declined, due first to economic growth in Spain and subsequently to the higher barriers to immigration erected in the destination countries following the oil crisis of the early 1970s.
However net positive outflows continued, although at a slower pace, during the first half of the 1980s when Spain was still suffering significant employment losses. During the 1980s and the early 1990s most of the inflows of Spanish nationals corresponded to Spaniards born in Spain, which means that this was return migration.
However in the 1990s, the big increase in these inflows came from Spaniards born abroad, which should not be considered return migration. Since Spanish nationality is acquired through parental nationality, regardless of the country of birth, it is likely that many foreigners (in the sense of people who had never lived in Spain before) were immigrating under Spanish nationality. By contrast, inflows of Spanish nationals born in Spain were relatively inelastic to later economic conditions. Also regarding the impact of the crisis, we observe a rise in the number of Spanish nationals returning to Spain from Asia and Africa, while in the case of Spaniards born abroad the most noticeable development is a further increase in the share of immigrants from the Americas. Table 5A also provides some information on the differences between new entrants before and after the crisis. Particularly noteworthy is that the foreign nationals and Spaniards born abroad are predominantly young males with low educational levels, whereas in the case of Spaniards born in Spain there is less difference by gender and they are older and overwhelmingly more highly skilled. After the crisis, the share of females and older and more highly educated workers increases in each group of migrants. This is not surprising, since the crisis was particularly harsh on young males with low educational levels. Indeed, even after controlling for the country of origin, the percentage of recent foreign immigrants with tertiary education has increased in almost all groups (see Table 5B ). has increased the share of outflows to Europe (mostly Germany and the UK) and the USA (see Table 6B ). Also noteworthy is that males are more likely to migrate abroad regardless of their nationality, and that gender differences are higher for foreign nationals. Foreign emigrants are generally older than foreign immigrants, whereas Spaniards born in Spain who emigrate are much younger than returning migrants. This could be because a large proportion of outflows of foreign nationals are return migration, whereas outflows of Spaniards born in Spain are first moves to another country. Lastly, the educational distribution of outflows of Spanish nationals is biased towards the more highly educated, but it is still below the educational attainment of the corresponding inflows.
8. One point that demonstrates that inflows of Spaniards born abroad should not be considered return migration is that their characteristics match those of foreign nationals rather than those of Spaniards born in Spain. 9. When return migration by foreign nationals was nonexistent.
Inter-regional migration flows in Spain (2008-2012)
Internal migration is a less costly alternative to international migration. During previous decades, the degree of inter-regional mobility in Spain was quite low, despite significant differences in unemployment rates and wages. 10 During the expansion and in subsequent years foreign nationals were much more likely to move within Spain than Spaniards. Indeed, the increase in internal migration since the 1990s can be fully associated with the higher share of foreigners in the population. However, more recently, the percentage of foreign nationals who move internally (some 0.35%) is lower than the percentage of those who move abroad (some 0.8%). In fact, although the percentage of foreigners who move either within Spain or abroad has remained roughly constant, internal moves have decreased while migration abroad has increased considerably. As for Spaniards, they had a clear preference for moving internally (1.1%) rather than migrating abroad (0.17%). However, during the Great Recession internal emigration has remained constant, while migration abroad has increased. and Dustmann and Weiss (2007) , the initiation of international migration might be related to wage differentials, employment conditions and their relationship to migration costs (both pecuniary and cultural). Also, some scholars have incorporate other reasons such as the diversification of risk within family members, differences in relative prices between host and home country, the accumulation of human capital, the improvement of the health status, or the willingness to reach a savings target to overcome capital constraints in the home country.
Recently, global value chains have also generated a new sort of temporary movements. On the other hand, the perpetuation of international migration might be also related to other independent factors such as the increase of networks or the support to transnational movement generated by particular institutions in the host and the receiving country.
In this paper we will focus on the differential of employment conditions gathering all other motivations in either pair of countries fixed effects or time dummies (similar to Grogger and Hanson, 2011). Typically the log odds of residing in country h for a person from country s is thought to be determined by absolute differences in earnings between the two countries and by the cost of migrating that is idiosyncratic to that particular country pair. However, when considering migration to or from Spain, earnings do not appear to be a good proxy for economic opportunities, since high unemployment rates have been prevalent: 8% at the peak of the cycle and currently around 26%. Indeed, changes in unemployment appear to be more appropriate than changes in wages to measure how economic opportunities evolve over time, particularly when, as has happened during the current recession, wages have reacted slowly to the worsening of the economic situation due to significant real and nominal rigidities.
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It is also usual to assume that migration flows respond symmetrically to changes in relative economic opportunities, so that the effects on migration flows of a change in relative economic conditions in one particular country should disappear completely when the initial economic conditions are restored. In this regard Chart 2, which relates the share of migrants in the total population to unemployment, shows that this has not been the case in Spain. The It seems, therefore, that analysing changes in the stock of foreign nationals in Spain in the current situation needs a more flexible specification than that used by Grogger and Hanson (2011) . Accordingly, we analyse the effects of economic conditions on both entries and exits separately (see Chart 3). The sharp decline in unemployment between 1995 and 11. On the adjustment of unemployment and wages across Spanish regions in previous recessions, see Bentolila and Jimeno (1998 to unemployment differentials (U) and to the costs of immigration/emigration between origin (h) and destination (s). 13 Using the superscript f to denote foreigners and e to denote Spaniards, our regression specifications are:
(1)
We proxy the cost of emigration (c) using a dummy for each origin country and destination region pair. We also include as covariates time dummies (ct) and, in the case of foreign immigration to Spain (or emigration of Spaniards), the logarithm of the stock of migrants of the same nationality (or who depart from a particular region in Spain) who reside in the corresponding potential destination in Spanish regions (or who reside in the corresponding potential destinations abroad) (Shst).
When running the above-mentioned specification a very high correlation is observed between time dummies, regional unemployment rates and, in the case of foreigners, the stock of migrants in each region. Indeed, all regional unemployment rates decreased until 2009 and rose thereafter, with a very low regional variation since there is a high correlation of regional unemployment rates over time.
14 12. The corresponding population for foreigners is the country of origin population; for Spaniards of one particular region in one particular country it is the population residing in that country and who are from that particular region.
Therefore it appears difficult to estimate the combined impact of regional unemployment rates, the stock of immigrants and time dummies on migration flows. Accordingly, our preferred estimate includes the unemployment rate in the country of origin, time dummies and country/region fixed effects. As a robustness check, we
13. Given the large disparities in unemployment rates across Spanish regions (see Chart 1), we consider the log odds of residing in a Spanish region (we have access to data on 17 regions) for one person of a particular country (we have access to data on some 80 countries). 14. Average correlation is 86% between two regions, with the exception of the Basque Country which has an average correlation with the rest of 68%.
run the same regressions without time dummies and including regional unemployment rates and the stock of immigrants. As indicated above, exits of foreigners from Spain are analysed by country of birth and assuming that they return to their birth country.
The literature has identified two problems with specifications such as (1) Regarding multilateral resistance to migration, autocorrelation of residuals in (1)- (3) cannot be ruled out. In consequence, the estimated coefficient of unemployment in the origin country might be upward biased. To solve this problem Bertoli, Brucker and Fernández (2013) add as an auxiliary variable the cross-section (over countries) average of the dependent and independent variables, using monthly observations, to incorporate the changes in the willingness to migrate to alternative destinations (Common Correlated Effect, CCE). In a similar way, we use regional variation to construct the cross-section average (over countries). Our hypothesis is that internal and international migration decisions are different, as foreign nationals first decide to migrate abroad, and then choose which Spanish region to live in. It is noteworthy, as indicated above, that regional unemployment patterns are quite similar over time. Accordingly, once in Spain, migrants do not consider moving between regions as a potential alternative to international migration. Under this assumption, we can apply the CCE correction auxiliary variable, that is, the cross-section average of the dependent and independent variables (by region and year) interacted with country of origin fixed effects, although with this approach only the coefficient of unemployment in the origin country can be identified. When we apply this CCE methodology at the regional level in (1), the autocorrelation disappears for foreign entries.
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In order to check the above hypothesis we also estimate equation (1) region than foreigners, whatever the age/education group; moreover, the log odds decrease with age and they increase with education, but only in the case of older workers. As for foreign nationals, the log odds are more similar across age/education groups and are highest for the youngest age group, whatever the education level. The other two panels of Chart 4
show that these log odds do not necessarily increase with unemployment differentials across regions. The responses of foreign nationals to unemployment differentials are negative and barely statistically significant in the case of young migrants with a high level of education and older workers with a medium level of education. The responses of Spanish nationals are positive and statistically significant for most age/education groups, which indicates that, as in the past in Spain, inter-regional migration flows are not contributing to the convergence of regional unemployment rates.
Results
The first three columns of Table 7 Table 7 shows that migration rates increase whenever the stock of migrants is higher. This is a well- Nevertheless, the inverted U-shape of the time dummies does not disappear, indicating that the good economic opportunities that were acting as pull factors during the housing boom were no longer valid after 2008.
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Columns 4 and 5 of Table 7 report the results on outflows of foreign nationals from Spain. Column 4 shows that pull factors are important and that foreigners are more likely to decide to leave Spain whenever their origin country records lower unemployment rates: a decrease of 10 pp in the unemployment rate in the birth country drives up migration outflow rates from Spain by 0.4 pp, which is quite similar to the response found for inflows to Spain. foreigners to or from Spain. The big difference in the observed magnitude of outflows between Spaniards and foreigners is better captured by the constant and the time dummies, so it should be attributed to the different costs of migration of the two groups. Chart 6 depicts the shape of time dummies, reflecting an increased willingness on the part of Spaniards born in Spain to move abroad over time. In contrast to the case of entries of foreigners, the stock of Spaniards born in Spain abroad does not affect the emigration rate (see column 7 of Table   7 ). This may be because emigration by Spaniards born in Spain is still a quite recent phenomenon and network effects are not yet operating (embassy registers record just under 650,000 Spaniards born in Spain and living abroad in 2012, which is less than 2% of the corresponding population). Column 8 shows that Spaniards from regions with higher unemployment rates are most likely to move abroad, which provides an alternative explanation for the increase in time dummies based on push factors. Table 8 summarises the results of our three preferred specifications taking into consideration the Correlated Effect (CCE). The main message from these relationships is that Spaniards born in Spain do not seem to have a lower response to economic conditions than foreigners when taking migration decisions.
Selection of migrants by education
Even though unemployment has risen across the board and has affected all regions and population groups, the labour market effects of the Great Recession in Spain have been higher for specific groups with close ties to the construction sector (for instance, young and less highly educated workers). In this section we explore whether the selection of migrants in the recent past has changed accordingly.
Changes in the composition of inflows of foreigners
To access sociodemographic information on inflows of foreigners we use Labour Force Survey 
education). Indeed in section 3 we documented a recent increase in inflows of
Europeans that could be responsible for this increase in the mean educational level of recent migrants. In column 2 we add country of birth dummies and find that adding in changes in source countries does not affect the selection by age, but it does alter the selection somewhat in terms of education. That is, although recent inflows still include a higher share of foreigners with tertiary education compared to earlier entrants, the weight of secondary education has diminished slightly. Thus, once we control for the composition of entrants by country of birth, the educational attainment of recent inflows has polarised, with a higher bias towards more highly educated immigrants. Columns 3 and 4 compare inflows before and after the crisis. Whether or not we account for changes in the composition of source countries, inflows post-crisis are older and far more likely to have tertiary education. This is consistent with the idea that opportunities for younger and less highly educated individuals have diminished since the onset of the crisis in 2008.
Changes in the composition of outflows of Spaniards born in Spain
In this case also we use LFS data to obtain information on Spaniards born in Spain who are temporarily working abroad. In principle one might expect that, at least for this group, when a household decides to emigrate, the head of the household will move first, followed by the other household members, so the LFS should record some of these temporary moves. Chart Column 1 shows that recent migrants from Spain (since 2008) are younger and more highly educated than Spaniards who stay in Spain, whether or not we control for differences in the provinces of origin. This is consistent with the hypothesis that there are factors that make migration less likely among less highly educated individuals (Grogger and Hanson, 2011, and McKenzie and Rapoport, 2013). Column 2 compares outflows at the start of the crisis and after 2010. Migrants departing after 2010 have once more become younger and less highly educated, which is consistent with the idea that these are the population groups that have been hardest hit by the crisis.
Changes in the composition of outflows of foreigners
In this case, we cannot use LFS data since most foreigners migrating abroad will not leave any household members in Spain. Therefore, we analyse how the composition of outflows of Spain, although, again, it is only significant for the first five years of residence.
As was the case with Spanish emigrants, foreign nationals leaving after 2008 were less highly educated, which is consistent with the fact that this is the population group that has been hardest hit by the crisis.
Concluding remarks
This paper provides a first look at the data on migration inflows and outflows in Spain during the Great Recession. Given the high proportion of recent immigrants to Spain and the high unemployment rates for all population groups and regions, one may expect significant migration outflows and a diverse composition depending on recent immigration status. Our still preliminary results hint at a significant change in the scale and composition of migration inflows and outflows. In terms of scale, Spanish and foreign nationals show quite a similar response to unemployment developments, and the continuing low exit rate of Spaniards born in Spain can only be attributed to the nonexistence of network effects for Spanish emigrants.
However, as we learnt from the rapid creation of networks of foreign nationals in Spain that attracted many immigrants to Spain during the housing boom, this is a phenomenon that could develop quite rapidly and independently of future unemployment developments.
The possibility of network effects starting to come into play for Spanish emigrants and of many outflows becoming permanent is a potential threat to Spanish economic output.
Moreover, the analysis shows that both Spanish and recent foreign migrants seem to be positively selected on education, even though the crisis has increased the likelihood of less Source: Labour Force Survey. 
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Source: (1) to (3) the dependent variable is the logarithm of entries from Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales by country of birth and region of destination in a particular year (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) over the population in the country of birth in the corresponding year (WEO). In (4) and (5) the dependent variable is the logarithm of exits from Estadística de Migraciones by country of birth and region of previous residence in a particular year (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) over the population of that particular origin in the corresponding Spanish region (padron). In (6) to (8) the dependent variable is the logarithm of exits of Spaniards born in Spain from Estadística de Migraciones by country of exit and region of previous residence in a particular year (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) ) over the population of Spaniards born in Spain in the corresponding region (padron). Unemployment rates of regions in Spain are from the labour force survey and unemployment in origin countries at the WEO. The stock of immigrants of a country of birth in a region is from the padron and the stock of Spaniards from a region in a country of destination is from Spanish embassies (PERE). Auxiliary regressors are time average of the corresponding dependent variable and the unemployment of the country interacted with fixed effects of the country of origin. Chart 4: Constant on a regression of log odds of internal migration by nationality representing costs of emigrating internally Source: Labour Force Survey. Sensitivity to Regional Unemployment differentials. Spaniards NB: Age/ skill group dummy interactions with regional unemployment differential in regression of log odds of internal migration. 95% confidence bands. Sensitivity to Regional Unemployment differentials. Foreigners NB: Age/ skill group dummy interactions with regional unemployment differential in regression of log odds of internal migration. 95% confidence bands.
Source: see Table 7 .
Chart 6: Time dummies of regressions with FE for outflows of foreigners and Spaniards born in Spain
Source: see Table 8 . Outflows of Spaniards born in Spain using alternative datasets LFS EVR
